VICTORIA AMIGABLE, VS. NICOLAS CUENCA, 
as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE PHIL.
43 SCRA 360

FACTS: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca (Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership and possession of her lot. The defendants denied the plaintiff’s allegations stating: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether of not the appellant may properly sue the government.

HOLDING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
                 As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after  hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated.

NOTE: THE GOVERNMENT, WHEN IT TAKES AWAY A PROPERTY FROM A PRIVATE LAND OWNER FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS OF EXPROPRIATION OR NEGOTIATED SALE, THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY PROPERLY MAINTAIN A SUIT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT VIOLATING THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. THIS DOCTRINE CANNOT BE USED IN PERPETRATING INJUSTICE TO A CITIZEN.

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