People of the Philippines vs. Genosa 


FACTS: Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15th of November 1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to her, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. Genosa said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, she (appellant) had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic Genosa testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but Ben (her husband) would always follow her and they would reconcile. Genosa said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because ‘he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was ten found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUE: Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-Defense?
 
HOLDING: No. Since the existence of the Battered wife Syndrome, which Genosa has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self- defense. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic Genosa there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behaviour and went to their children’s bedroom. During the time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Without continuous aggression there can be no self- defense. Absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self- defense.
The court ruled, conviction of appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is affirmed, but there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, her penalty was reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

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