Dy Cuenco vs. Sec. of Justice
L- 18069 May 26, 1962

FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
counsel for petitioner Alfonso Dy Cuenco wrote to the Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon the ground that he had exercised the right to elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV, section I(4) of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. Said election appears in an affidavit dated May 15, 1951, stating that petitioner was born in Dapa, Surigao, on February 16, 1923; that his parents are "Benito Dy Cuenco, Chinese (now deceased)" and "Julita Duyapit, Filipina, a native of Surigao, Philippines"; that he is "married to Rosalinda Villanueva, a Filipino," by whom he has four (4) legitimate children; that he renounces all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines. On the same date, petitioner, likewise, took the corresponding oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary of Justice who,  rendered an opinion (No. 129) holding that the alleged Philippine citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen. Petitioner sought a rehearing and a reconsideration of said opinion. Secretary of Justice, who denied the petition for reconsideration. About a year later, petitioner instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila the present action for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to recognize as valid said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of registration. Said court rendered judgment for the petitioner. Hence, this appeal by respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the election of Philippine Citizenship of the petitioner is valid.

HOLDING: No. Election must be made within a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority. 3 years is a reasonable period, however, may be extended under certain circumstances as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. In the case at bar the petitioner reached the aged of majority 1944, he made his election of citizenship 1951 when he was 28 years old, 7 years after he reached the age of majority. Petitioner cited his reasons for the delayed election but the court stated that it was insufficient excuse for the delay of the said election.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered dismissing the petition, with costs against petitioner.

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