Cimafranca Jr. v Sandiganbayan |194 scra 107


Facts: Petitioner Emiliano Cimafranca Jr. was the provincial fisheries inspector. He was issued a revolver and a Briggs and Stratton engine. When his temporary appointment expired, he was advised by the provincial Governor and the OIC of the Office of the Treasurer to return the revolver and engine. Petitioner did not comply. During the property audit directed by the provincial auditor on the ten(10) government officials including the petitioner, they found out that, although separated from the service, petitioner had not yet settled his property accountabilities, despite demands. Petitioner was charged of malversation of public property. During the trial the revolver and engine was returned to the Government by the petitioner. After trial, the petitioner was found guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON an accountable public officer may be criminally liable for malversation of public property when he fails to return or produce the  same upon demand, although after the filing of the information and during the trial he returned the property to the government.

Holding: Since petitioner failed to overturn the prima facie ebidence of guilt by non-production of the government property upon previous repeated demands, and as he produces it only much later, that is, after several years, the only logical conclusion is that he misappropriated the property and/or otherwise allowed other person to take and appropriate the same. The SC has made the consistent pronouncement that the return of the funds malversed is not a defense and will not be an exempting circumstances nor a ground for extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused. At best it can be mitigating circumstances.
            The same principle should apply when the subject matter of the malversation is public property. However, when as in this case, it took the petitioner several years before he returned the government property, such circumstance cannot be considered as special mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender, as the trial court did credit to the petitioner. Said government property appears to be under the control and possession of the petitioner all the time. There was no reason why he could not return the same promptly, if not soonest to the government. The much delayed return of the property must be a desperate act and afterthought of petitioner when he realized that all possible hope of exoneration was lost during the trial.

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