People v. Lidres (108 Phil. 995)

FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez. The Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an agreement, wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to take over Echavez’ position on a “50-50” basis, e.i that is the period from January to March 1954, would be equally divided between them. Diotay then took over and began teaching.
            However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it, the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it or not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954. True to his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to take over. He held class with the half of the class and erased Diotay’s name from the attendance chart and place his own. Diotay informed the principal and the following day they were summoned by the supervising teacher, ordered Diotay to continue her teaching and advised Lidres not to go back to the school. Without heeding the said instruction Lidres without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay’s class against the latter’s will.
            Lidres was charged and prosecuted with the crime of Usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in R.A. No. 10.

ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities.

HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses indisputably that said Act was really intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its passage in September 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of pretense of official position required under Article 177 of the RPC. And since it is neither alleged in the information nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member of a seditious organization engaged in subversive activities, he could not be liable or found guilty under said provision of R.A. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that R.A. No. 10 is an amendment to Art. 177, and not merely an implementation thereof, the subsequent enactment of R.A. 379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute an amendment thereof restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions. Under R.A. 379, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense “without pretense of official position.” Under the circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense.

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