LETICIA LIGON v COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, G.R. No. 127683 | August 7, 1998 | 294 scra 73


FACTS: Petitioner Leticia P. Ligon (hereafter LIGON) is the mortgagee in three deeds of mortgage covering two parcels of land located along Tandang Sora, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, belonging to the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (hereafter IDP).  These deeds of mortgage were executed by certain Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag and Rowaida Busran-Sampaco as security for the loans of P3 million, P2 million, and P4 million, respectively, which IDP allegedly obtained from LIGON.
Two groups had earlier vied for control of the IDP, namely, (1) the Carpizo group and (2) the Abbas group. The Carpizo group caused the signing of an alleged Board Resolution authorizing the sale of the two parcels of land mentioned above to private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, wherein IDP and INC stipulated that the former would evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the two lots within forty-five (45) days from execution of the sale. IDP failed to clear the lots of squatters, hence, INC filed a complaint for specific performance with damages.
IDP’s original Board of Trustees headed by Senator Mamintal Tamano, or the Tamano group, filed a petition with SEC to annul the sale of the two lots to INC. The SEC promulgated its decision in SEC Case No. 4012 annulling, inter alia, the sale of the two parcels of land to INC.  Aggrieved, INC filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted INC’s petition and set aside the portion of the SEC decision declaring the sale null and void.  Consequently, the Tamano group appealed to court in a petition for review.
The INC filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint[5] for the annulment of the deeds of mortgage over the two lots, impleading as defendants therein LIGON, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Rowaida Busran-Sampaco, and the IDP.  Later, LIGON filed a motion to declare INC and IDP in default for their failure to file an answer to her counterclaim and cross-claim, respectively. INC opposed the motion, saying that some of the grounds raised by LIGON in her counterclaim were sufficiently dealt with in INC’s complaint the trial court granted LIGON’s motion and allowed LIGON to present evidence ex-parte to support her cross-claim against IDP. Then, LIGON filed an urgent motion for rendition of partial judgment against IDP in the cross-claim for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The trial court rendered a partial judgment (1) ordering IDP to pay LIGON the amounts of P3 million, P2 million, and P4 million “with interest at 36% per annum compounded annually” from the dates the loans became due and demandable; and (2) directing the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment of said amounts. INC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the partial judgment, which was, denied.
Consequently, INC filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to annul the aforementioned partial judgment and the order denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Undaunted by the foregoing adversities, LIGON filed the instant petition claiming that respondent Court of Appeals (1) acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to order INC to implead or include IDP as an indispensable party in the petition for certiorari; (2) acted without jurisdiction in annulling the decision of the lower court; and (3) erred in not dismissing INC’s petition because INC was not aggrieved by the trial court’s decision and was guilty of forum-shopping.

ISSUE: WON INC was guilty of forum-shopping.

RULING: The SC hold that INC did not engage in forum-shopping.  There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum or, it may be added, in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari, raising identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Yet another indication is when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.  The test is whether in the two or more pending cases there is an identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.
INC instituted Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 to compel IDP to comply with its undertaking to clear of squatters the lots the latter sold to the former.  On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 INC sought to annul the mortgages and enjoin LIGON from foreclosing them.  The two cases involved different transactions and sought different reliefs.  Moreover, INC won in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937; hence, it cannot be said that the later Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 was filed as a result of an adverse decision in one forum.  On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 40258 was a special civil action for certiorari, which was instituted, and correctly so, in reaction to an adverse partial decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494.


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