US v. Serapio [23 P 584]

FACTS: Defendant was charged with the crime of libel. Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned. Upon arraignment the defendant, by his attorneys, presented the following demurrer:I. The facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a crime. II. It appears from the allegation in the complaint that if there were a crime it has prescribed. With reference to the second ground, counsel for the defense maintains that the crime has prescribed under the provisions of the laws in force in the Islands and supports such conclusion by asserting that in the absence of a definite provision in Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, which fixes the time during which the penal action arising from the crime of libel may be exercised, the time which article 131 of the Penal Code fixes for the prescription of the crimes of calumny and insults is strictly applicable.
Against this contention of the defense, the Attorney-General and the private prosecutor maintain that the prescription of a general nature contained in said article 131 is not applicable, for two reasons: First, because the crime of libel is entirely distinct and independent from calumny and insults; and Second, because that provision of the code in the matter of prescription of crimes is not applicable to the crimes created and punished by special laws promulgated by the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature.
ISSUE: whether the rules of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the penalty to be imposed in the crimes punished by a special Act.
RULING: But it is no less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal act is not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such description." In our opinion this is the correct rule. The doctrine of prescription or the limitation of time within which an action may be brought, is of purely statutory origin. Both under the common and the civil law a right of action never died by mere lapse of time. The court, in the absence of express law, has no authority to fix a period of prescription or limitation. Under the Penal Code the word "prescription" is used with reference to the time within which the action must be brought. (See Penal Code, art. 130, paragraphs 6 and 7.).By prescription or limitation of actions, the right of action is not extinguished, neither under the common nor under the civil law. Both the Civil and Penal Codes provide when the action is extinguished and when it is prescribed simply. These statutes (of prescription or limitation)did not destroy the right. They simply provided in effect, that, after the lapse of the time prescribed by law, the defendant might object, if he desired, to being sued. If the defendant failed, in some proper way, to object, or, in other words, interpose the statutory defense, the action could be maintained. The statute provided a special defenses imply. If the defense of prescription or limitation is not expressly raised, it is waived and is not available. It cannot be raised by demurrer. It must be expressly pleaded. Our conclusions, then, following the rule heretofore adopted by this court, are:First. That by reason of article 7 of the Penal Code, some of the general provisions of said code do not apply to the penal laws of the United States Commission, unless, by express provision of law, they are made applicable.Second. That there is no general or special provision of law making any of the provisions of the Penal Code applicable to the Libel of Law of the United States Commission (Act No. 277), except the provision as to subsidiary imprisonment when a fine is imposed. (Act No. 1732.).Third. That the period of prescription fixed by article 131 of the Penal Code for calumny and insults, does not apply to the crime of libel as defined and punished under Act No. 277 of the United States Commission.
Fourth. That unless a period of prescription or limitation is fixed by law for a particular offense or crime, the action for such offense or a crime is not barred by lapse of time.Fifth. That the law defining and punishing the crime of libel (Act No. 277) has not fixed a period of prescription or limitation within which an action for such crime shall be instituted.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court, sustaining the second ground of demurrer, is hereby reversed, and it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court from which it came, with direction that the defendant Jose S. Serapio be ordered to appear and plead to the complaint presented in this cause.

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